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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior studies have shown that newly public firms exhibit a high degree of uncertainty and asymmetric 
information, with few reliable sources of information. These findings suggest that investors could benefit 
if some independent party is able to assess the quality of a newly public firm. Since other studies have 
found that banks can reduce information asymmetry about firms that borrow, we examine whether 
banks provide information about the quality of newly public firms. We find that bank lending is 
consistently associated with positive long-term outcomes—newly public firms that borrow experience 
significantly smaller decreases in operating performance and better long-term stock performance than 
non-borrowers.   
 
JEL Classification: G14, G21 
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I. Introduction 
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING (IPO) is a significant 
information-releasing event in the life of a firm, newly public firms experience a high 
degree of uncertainty and asymmetric information between the firm and investors, with 
few reliable sources of information (Teoh, Wong, and Rao, 1998). Several studies have 
documented that IPO firms, on average, generate positive abnormal stock returns in  
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Entrepreneurial Finance meetings, and Multinational Finance Association meetings for providing helpful 
comments on the earlier draft of this paper. 
the short run but declining stock and operating performance in the long run (e.g., 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Furthermore, owners of a pre-IPO firm possess private 
information about the quality of the firm and may not truthfully disclose this 
information. Consistent with this notion, Ang and Brau (2002) show that IPO 
prospectuses are contaminated by optimistic bias, window dressing, and earnings 
manipulation. Teoh et al. (1998) report that newly public firms are more likely to 
engage in earnings management than are seasoned publicly traded firms. Moreover, 
analysts are overoptimistic about newly public firms and systematically overestimate 
their earnings (e.g., Dechow et al. 2000; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and 
Womack, 1999; Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Teoh and Wong, 2002).    
The evidence in the studies highlighted above suggests that investors could 
benefit if some independent party were available to help assess the quality of a newly 
public firm. Theories of financial intermediation postulate that banks, through 
screening and monitoring associated with their lending activity, play a special role in 
reducing information asymmetry about firms that borrow (see Diamond 1984, 1991; 
Fama 1985; and Ramakrishan and Thakor1984). This study examines whether banks 
provide valuable information about the quality of newly public firms. Specifically, we 
examine whether bank lending to newly public firms is associated with better long-run 
performance in operating returns and stock returns. 
We document a positive relation between bank lending and long-term 
performance of newly public firms. Generally, operating performance declines several 
years after an IPO.1 However, post-IPO borrowers experience significantly smaller 
declines in operating performance than do non-borrowers. Furthermore, post-IPO 
borrowers have better stock performance up to three years following the IPO. These 
findings suggest that banks perform an important role in certifying firm quality 
(identifying firms with better future prospects) and/or contributing to borrowers’ 
subsequent performance through mechanisms identified in previous studies, such as 
monitoring or loan covenants (Diamond, 1984).  
                                                 
 
 
1 Field and Karpoff (2002), Friedlan (1994), Jain and Kini (1994), and Mikkelson et al. (1997) also 
document post-IPO performance decline.  
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This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways.  First, we 
document that bank loans serve as a significant source of funds for newly public firms.  
Second, we show that bank lending helps to reduce information asymmetry and 
uncertainty about newly public firms. Third, we extend studies on bank lending to 
private and pre-IPO firms and show that the positive effect of bank lending continues 
in the post-IPO stage.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews 
related literature. Section III describes the data and examines differences in 
characteristics between post-IPO borrowers and non-borrowers. Section IV compares 
post-IPO operating and stock performance of borrowing and non-borrowing firms. 
Section V concludes the paper. 
II. Literature Review 
Accepted theories of financial intermediation postulate that banks acquire private 
information during the lending process (e.g., Berlin and Loeys, 1988; Bernanke, 1983; 
Diamond 1984, 1991; Fama, 1985). Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the main 
reason for the existence of intermediaries is information asymmetry. Campbell and 
Kracaw (1980) argue that financial intermediaries produce information because the 
production of information and various intermediary services are naturally 
complimentary activities.2Overall, prior studies have concluded that banks use 
information-gathering and screening technology to produce information about a 
borrowing firm by thoroughly scrutinizing the borrower (e.g., Lummer and 
McConnell, 1989; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). When a lending decision becomes 
publicly available, it therefore provides a favorable signal to the market about the future 
prospects of the borrowing firm. 
In addition, banks undertake ongoing monitoring of borrowing firms while a 
loan is outstanding (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985). Such monitoring, combined with 
loan covenants and collateral requirements, helps to mitigate moral hazards and reduces 
the borrower’s likelihood of default (Rajan and Winton, 1995). Monitoring by the 
lending bank is another reason why we might expect bank lending to be associated with 
improved subsequent operating performance of the borrower.  
                                                 
 
 
2See also theoretical works by Black (1975), Kane and Malkiel (1965), Ramakrishan and Thakor (1984), 
and Boyd and Prescott (1986).   
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Theory thus indicates at least two mechanisms by which a bank loan can enhance 
a borrowing firm’s value: screening, in which banks attempt to identify successful firms 
ex ante and monitoring, in which banks attempt to induce borrowing firms to achieve 
positive financial outcomes after the loan has been originated. Several empirical studies 
provide evidence that bank loans are “special” or “unique” by documenting positive 
abnormal returns to the announcements of bank loan agreements (e.g., James, 1987; 
Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986).   
The unique feature of our study is that we examine bank lending to newly public 
firms. In the empirical sections below, we test the hypothesis that bank loans are 
associated with improved subsequent operating performance. More recent studies have 
found positive effects of bank lending among private and pre-IPO firms (Schenone, 
2004; Gonzalez and James, 2007; Benzoni and Schenone, 2010), whereas studies of 
seasoned public firms have found no such positive effects of bank lending (Billett et al. 
2006; Fields et al. 2006). Reconciling these contrasting results is possible if the 
informational benefit of bank lending dissipates soon after a firm goes public. Such a 
pattern seems plausible because the IPO process generates and discloses new financial 
information about the firm. Therefore, by using data for newly public firms, we also 
shed new light on whether the pre-IPO benefits of bank lending identified in the prior 
literature vanish immediately upon going public or instead persist into the first years 
after the IPO. The next section describes our data and sample in more detail. 
III. Sample Description  
A. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
We combine data from the following four sources: the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) New Issues database, the Dealscan database, the Center for 
Research and Security Prices (CRSP), and COMPUSTAT. The SDC New Issues 
database is utilized to identify U.S. common stock offerings during the period January 
1, 1990 ‒ December 31, 2000.3 We eliminate closed-end funds, depositary shares, real 
                                                 
 
 
3 Our sample starts in 1990 because Dealscan has limited coverage of bank loans prior to the 1990s. 
Previous studies that document benefits of pre-IPO bank lending also end their samples in 2000(see, for 
example, Schenone, 2004; Gonzalez and James, 2007; Benzoni and Schenone, 2010).Thus, this time 
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estate investment trusts (REITs), spinoffs, unit issues, reverse leveraged buyouts, 
financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999), and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). We 
also eliminate IPOs with offer prices below five dollars, and we check for the 
availability of post-IPO stock and accounting data on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, 
respectively. Previous IPO studies have used similar sample exclusion criteria (for 
example, Jain and Kini, 1994; Field and Karpoff, 2002; Gonzalez and James, 2007; 
Field and Lowry, 2009). Our final IPO sample contains 3,218 firms.   
Data on the offer date, offer price, initial filing range, net IPO proceeds, and on 
whether the firm was backed by a venture capitalist are collected from SDC. For each 
firm, we also calculate the price run-up as the percentage difference between the offer 
price and the midpoint of the initial filing range. In addition, we compute the initial 
return as the percentage difference between the first after-market closing price and the 
offer price. We also record firm age, measured as the number of years since the 
company was founded.4 
To determine which IPO firms receive bank loans soon after the initial public 
offering, we collect information on bank loans from the Dealscan database supplied by 
the Loan Pricing Corporation. Dealscan provides information on the characteristics 
and terms of bank loans, including the identity of the borrower and the lender and the 
date, type, amount, rate, and collateral of the loan. We restrict our sample to U.S. firms 
that borrowed from banks during the period January 1, 1990 – December 31, 2001, 
and we have loan year stock returns and accounting data on CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT, respectively. The sample period for loan deals is set at one year longer 
than the sample period for IPO firms to include information on loan deals for at least 
one year after the initial public offering in our analysis. To ensure that the abnormal 
“tech bubble” years do not influence our results, we check the robustness of our main 
findings by excluding firms that went public during 1998 – 2000; the results do not 
change qualitatively and are not reported for brevity. 
Using Dealscan data, we collect information on the first bank loan to a newly 
public firm with the loan active date within one year from the IPO offer date. Out of 
                                                                                                                                         
 
 
period allows us to draw comparisons and make connections with the existing literature on the positive 
effects of bank lending for young public firms. 
4 We thank Laura Field for providing firm age data. These data come from various sources and are 
described in Field and Lowry (2009, footnote 2). 
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3,218 IPO firms, 765 had a loan agreement within one year from the initial public 
offering. One-third of these loan deals occurred during the first quarter after the IPO 
date. Hereinafter, firms that borrow from banks within one year after the IPO date are 
called “post-IPO borrowers.” Firms that do not borrow within one year after the IPO 
are labeled “non-borrowers.” Table I presents a summary of the variable definitions and 
sources of data. 
 
B. Summary Statistics 
Table II reports sample descriptive statistics on the number of IPOs, the IPO 
offer characteristics, the number of post-IPO borrowers, and on bank loan 
characteristics, aggregated across the total sample and by IPO year. The average firm in 
the sample raised about US$50 million in net IPO proceeds and experienced a first-day 
return of about 26 percent. The median firm raised more than US$26 million, with a 
median initial return of 10 percent. The time trends in the number of IPOs, IPO 
proceeds, and initial IPO returns are consistent with those of previous studies and show 
a well-documented pattern that IPOs in the period from the late 1990s to the early 
2000s were large IPOs with high first-day returns (see Loughran and Ritter, 2004; 
Ritter and Welch, 2002). 
It is striking that, despite the funds raised in an IPO, many newly public firms 
draw on bank financing. In the sample of 3,218 U.S. firms that went public during 
1990 – 2000, almost one-quarter (764, or 24 percent) borrowed from banks at least 
once during their first year of public trading. The average loan amount was $84 
million, which is 1.7 times the average amount raised through the initial public 
offering.  The median loan amount was more than $30 million, which is also larger 
than the median $26 million raised by a firm through an IPO. Overall, banks 
contributed a significant portion to the financing mix of newly public firms, with the 
loan amount exceeding the net IPO proceeds by 44 percent. These statistics suggest 
that a significant portion of newly public firms rely heavily on bank loans soon after the 
initial public offering.   
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Table I 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Firm Characteristics      Source:  All variables, unless stated otherwise, are from 
 COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual 
Total Assets data6 
Sales data12  
Tot Debt /Tot Assets leverage ratio = (data9+data5)/data6 
PPE /Total Assets tangible assets =ratio of property, plan 
equipment to total assets = data7/data6 
ROA return on assets = ratio of net income to total assets = data13/data6 
Inv. / Total Assets data3/data6 
Tobin’s Q market value of equity plus total debt, divided by total assets  
 =(data24*data25+data9+data5)/data6 
Age firm age (in years) from the date of incorporation to the IPO date; see 
Field and Lowry (2009) for explanation of data sources. 
Tech Industry an indicator variable that equals 1 for firms in the technology industry 
(based on four digit SIC codes listed in Loughran and Ritter, 2004) 
and equals 0 otherwise 
Offer Characteristics      Source:  SDC New Issues database 
Net IPO Proceeds the amount raised by a firm through the initial public offering,  
minus the total fees paid, adjusted for inflation and reported in 
millions of real 1990 dollars 
VC-backed an indicator variable that equals 1 if an IPO firm was backed by a 
venture capitalist at the time of IPO and equals 0 otherwise 
Price Run-up the percentage difference between the offer price and the midpoint of 
the initial filing range 
Initial Return the percentage difference between the first after-market closing 
price (from CRSP) and the offer price 
Loan Characteristics      Source:  Dealscan 
Loan Amount the amount borrowed from a bank, adjusted for inflation and reported 
in millions of real 1990 dollars 
All-In Spread Drawn measures the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for 
each dollar drawn down and includes the spread of the loan and any 
annual or facility fee paid to the bank  
Syndicate an indicator variable that equals 1 if more than one bank was involved 
in loan agreement and equals 0 otherwise 
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Table II 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample includes 3,218 U.S. firms that went public during 1990-2000. Post-IPO Borrowers are 765 
firms that borrow from banks within one year from the firm’s IPO. IPO data are from SDC, bank loan 
data are from Dealscan, and stock performance data are from CRSP. Net IPO Proceeds and Loan Amount 
are adjusted for inflation and are reported in millions of real 1990 dollars. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table I. 
  IPO Offer Characteristics Bank Loan Characteristics 
  Loan  
  Amount/ All-In 
  Net IPO Initial Number Loan Net IPO Spread 
 Numb Proceeds Return of Amount Proceeds Drawn 
IPO of Mean Mean post-IPO Mean Mean Mean 
Year IPOs [Median] [Median] Borrowers [Median] [Median] [Median] 
1990 68 37.33 8.08 19 85.59 1.59 201.25 
  [23.43] [5.72] [20.00] [0.88] [255.00] 
1991 175 42.20 12.13 41 91.19 1.20 234.71 
  [24.94] [7.50] [15.33] [0.62] [255.00] 
1992 270 38.98 10.76 70 46.78 1.10 241.21 
  [22.40] [4.36] [23.16] [0.85] [250.00] 
1993 350 33.74 12.07 101 63.61 1.32 209.46 
  [22.46] [6.13] [35.78] [0.94] [200.00] 
1994 291 29.38 9.84 72 67.23 1.36 187.78 
  [19.33] [4.81] [32.13] [1.23] [175.00] 
1995 322 40.65 21.00 67 110.47 1.48 199.67 
  [24.70] [12.54] [23.35] [0.67] [200.00] 
1996 476 41.22 16.83 127 100.78 1.93 209.68 
  [25.97] [10.00] [30.38] [0.98] [200.00] 
1997 355 39.34 13.67 113 68.08 1.38 186.44 
  [23.69] [8.90] [23.16] [1.00] [175.00] 
1998 214 77.02 23.16 61 139.00 2.02 192.26 
  [26.78] [9.47] [56.47] [1.33] [175.00] 
1999 383 77.25 72.98 54 156.73 0.95 212.08 
  [37.34] [38.75] [39.89] [0.50] [212.50] 
2000 314 84.76 58.09 40 181.36 0.95 256.69 
    [43.31] [28.14] [33.78] [0.52] [255.00] 
10-Year  49.59 25.93 84.05 1.44 208.00 
Averages   [26.47] [10.00] [30.31] [0.91] [200.00] 
Totals 3,218 765  
 
 The time trends in loan frequency and loan characteristics are also noteworthy.  
By the end of the sample period, which was characterized by large IPO proceeds and 
high initial returns, the proportion of IPO firms receiving bank loans dropped to less 
than 13 percent. Firms borrowed large amounts during those years, with the mean loan  
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amount peaking at $181 million (median = $34 million) in 2000. However, the loan 
amounts were smaller relative to net IPO proceeds during those years than in any prior 
year. Furthermore, the loan cost was relatively high at the end of the sample period. 
The mean loan cost, measured by “all-in spread drawn,” was 208 points (median = 
200) for the overall sample and reached 257 basis points (median = 255) in 2000.5 
These statistics show that fewer IPO firms borrowed from banks during the “tech 
bubble” years (1998 – 2000), but those firms that did borrow during those years paid 
higher interest rates. This pattern could indicate that many firms did not need bank 
loans during those years since they were able to raise large amounts through an IPO. 
An alternative explanation is that banks were more selective during “hot IPO” years. 
They loaned to fewer IPO firms, offered smaller amounts relative to net IPO proceeds, 
and charged higher interest rates.    
In non-tabulated analysis, we examine the distribution of loans by loan purpose, 
loan structure, and firms’ credit rating and find the following patterns. The most 
frequently stated purpose of a loan is general corporate purpose (35 percent of loans),  
followed by debt repayment (25 percent) and working capital needs (16 percent).  Sixty 
percent of post-IPO loans are secured. The Standard and Poor’s credit rating at the 
close of the loan deal is A-AAA for 1.4 percent of the firms, B-BBB for 12.9 percent of 
the firms, and is not available for 85 percent of the sample firms. 
C. Borrowers versus Non-Borrowers 
Table III compares characteristics of post-IPO borrowers and non-borrowers. All 
accounting measures are from COMPUSTAT for the year immediately prior to the 
IPO year. Since about one third of post-IPO borrowers receive loans within three 
months of the initial public offering, the arbitrary choice of a pre-IPO year ensures that 
firms’ characteristics are not affected by the bank loan examined in the following 
analysis. Data prior to their IPO year are not available on 178 firms.6 
                                                 
 
 
5 “All-in spread drawn,” reported by Dealscan, measures the amount the borrower pays in basis points 
over the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for each dollar drawn down, and includes the spread 
of the loan and any annual or facility fee paid to the bank group. 
6 Of these, 38 firms borrowed from the banks within one year of their IPO date. For these 178 firms, we 
collect accounting variables for the IPO year. The main results do not change if we omit these firms 
from the analysis.    
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Table III shows that post-IPO borrowers are quite different from non-borrowers. 
They are much larger (as measured by the firms’ assets and sales), have higher leverage 
(measured by the ratio of debt to assets), and carry a higher level of inventory relative to 
total assets.  Post-IPO borrowers are more profitable (measured by return on assets) 
and invest more in tangible assets (measured by the ratio of property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets).   
Offer characteristics also differ between post-IPO borrowers and non-borrowers. 
Post-IPO borrowers have been in business longer at the time they go public, are less 
likely to be backed by venture capitalists, and are less likely to operate in the technology 
industry. Post-IPO borrowers also have lower initial returns.   
In summary, this section documents that a significant portion of newly public 
firms borrow large amounts from banks soon after the initial public offering. The firm 
and IPO characteristics of post-IPO borrowers are quite different from those of non-
borrowers. The next section examines whether bank lending is associated with better 
performance of newly public firms. 
IV. Post-IPO Borrowers versus Non-Borrowers: Post-IPO Performance 
 Fama (1985) argues that banks may enhance a borrowing firm’s value by 
reducing information asymmetry or by monitoring firm performance. We investigate 
whether bank lending within one year after the initial public offering is associated with 
better subsequent operating and long-term stock performance.7 This setting allows us 
to examine whether banks enhance the performance of borrowing firms in an 
environment with high information production by public sources and also with a high 
degree of uncertainty about future firm performance. 
Our model and data have several intrinsic limitations. Like other studies in the 
literature, we cannot establish causality between bank lending and firms’ financial 
outcomes. Similarly, we cannot identify whether any observed differences in 
performance between borrowers and non-borrowers are attributed to banks’ screening 
activities versus monitoring or loan covenants. Finally, we cannot observe the demand 
for bank loans, and thus cannot say whether non-borrowing firms were denied bank 
                                                 
 
 
7 In unreported analysis, we find no differences in survival rates between post-IPO borrowers and non-
borrowers. This suggests that we do not encounter a survivorship bias when comparing the long-term 
performance of borrowers and non-borrowers. 
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credit or did not need to borrow. Other studies of bank lending have all faced these or 
similar limitations (Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Billett et al. 2006; Gonzalez and 
James, 2007; Benzoni and Schenone, 2010).   
 
A. Changes in Operating Performance after the IPO 
We first investigate whether a firm’s post-IPO operating performance is related to 
its borrowing soon after the initial public offering. Operating performance is measured 
as operating return on assets (ROA), which equals operating income divided by the 
book value of total assets. We examine both raw and industry-adjusted changes in ROA 
measured from the IPO year through each of the five years following the IPO. The raw 
change in ROA for IPO firm i from the year of the IPO (year 0) to year t is  
 
ROAi,(0,t) = ROAi,t‒ ROAi,0     (1) 
  
The industry-adjusted change in ROA controls for the contemporaneous change 
in firm i’s industry ROA and is measured as firm i’s change in ROA minus the industry 
median change in ROA on the same date. The industries are based on the most 
disaggregated SIC category containing at least five non-IPO firms, up to four-digit SIC 
codes.8 The industry-adjusted change in ROA for IPO firm i from the year of the IPO 
(year 0) to year t is:  
 
 
Adjusted ROAi,(0,t )= (ROAi,t‒ ROAi,0)– (Industry Median ROAi,t  
– Industry Median ROAi,0)                 (2) 
 
Data to compute changes in ROA through the first post-IPO year are available 
for 2,906 IPO firms, declining to 1,723 firms for a five-year change in ROA.   
                                                 
 
 
8 That is, we use four-digit SIC codes for industries containing at least five non-IPO firms, or three-digit 
SIC codes if there are at least five non-IPO firms at the three-digit level but not at the four-digit level. 
We use two-digit SIC codes if the three-digit level contains fewer than five non-issuing firms.   
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Table IV reports mean values of raw and industry-adjusted changes in ROA 
measured through each of the five years following the IPO. Consistent with prior 
studies, operating performance declines over all time intervals examined (see Field and 
Karpoff, 2002; Friedlan, 1994; Jain and Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al. 1997). As shown 
in Panel A, the mean change in the raw ROA from the IPO year to the following year 
is –0.051, with a t-statistic of –12.45.  The mean change from the IPO year through 
the following two years is –0.069, with a t-statistic of –13.46. The average change in 
raw ROA remains around –0.06 through years 3, 4, and 5.   
Panel B shows that industry-adjusted changes in ROA are also significantly 
negative for the first five years after the IPO. From the IPO year to the following year, 
the industry-adjusted change in ROA is –0.039 with a t-statistic of –9.20. From the 
IPO year to years 2 and 3, the industry-adjusted change in ROA is about –0.05, 
leveling off to about –0.040 for years 4 and 5 after the IPO.   
Table IV further reports differences in raw and industry-adjusted changes in 
operating performance between post-IPO borrowers and non-borrowers. Within three 
years after the IPO, changes in operating performance tend to be less negative for firms 
that borrow from banks within one year after the IPO than for other firms. For 
example, from the IPO to the following year, the mean industry-adjusted change in 
ROA is –0.046 for non-borrowing firms, compared to –0.016 for borrowing firms. 
This difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and decreases starting in 
year 3 after the IPO. By year 5, this difference disappears. This suggests that banks are 
“special” in the sense that they are able to identify firms with better future prospects 
and/or contribute to better operating performance of post-IPO borrowers through 
monitoring, loan covenants, or related mechanisms.   
Table V provides additional support for this finding. It reports the results of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of industry-adjusted changes in ROA on the 
presence of post-IPO loan and other firm characteristics, measured through two years 
after the initial public offering. Post-IPO Loan is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
firm borrows from a bank within one year after its IPO, and equals 0 otherwise. Other 
variables (Tobin’s Q, Ln (Net IPO Proceeds), Ln (1+Age), Initial Return, VC-backed) are 
included to control for characteristics of firms and offers. IPO-year dummy variables 
are also included but are not reported in the table.  
As shown in Table V, borrowing from a bank within one year after the initial 
public offering is associated with significantly positive changes in industry-adjusted 
operating performance. Taken together with the results from the univariate analysis, 
this evidence suggests that, controlling for various firm characteristics, post-IPO 
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borrowers experience smaller performance declines after the IPO compared to non-
borrowers. This finding refines the conclusion of Billett et al. (2006) that, in general, 
borrowers experience significantly negative operating performance, by suggesting that 
despite this pattern, post-IPO borrowers perform better than non-borrowers. 
Therefore, some borrowers (including post-IPO borrowers) seem to benefit from bank 
lending. 
B. Post-IPO Stock Performance 
We next investigate another measure of firm performance: post-IPO long-run 
stock returns. Table VI reports monthly buy-and-hold (BH) returns for one, two, and 
three years after the initial public offering date for post-IPO borrowers and non-
borrowers. Raw returns (BH Raw) and returns  
adjusted for a value-weighted (BHVW) and an equally weighted (BHEW) CRSP index 
are presented for all three years. For firms that do not survive for a given year after a 
firm’s IPO, we consider monthly returns up to the last available return.   
Results presented in Table VI show that post-IPO borrowers perform better than 
non-borrowers in each time period considered. For example, firms that borrow from 
banks within one year after that firm’s IPO outperform non-borrowing firms by 14 
percent (using the CRSP value-weighted benchmark) during the first year after the 
initial public offering.  The difference in buy-and-hold abnormal returns between post-
IPO borrowers and non-borrowers is statistically significant over the one- and two-year 
post-IPO time periods. This pattern contrasts with the negative three-year abnormal 
stock returns found by Billett et al. (2006) for seasoned (i.e., non-IPO) firms, but is 
consistent with the idea presented in the introduction that banks may help alleviate the 
informational noise surrounding newly public firms.  
Table VII provides additional support for this finding. It reports the results of an 
ordinary least squares regression of the two-year buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(adjusted for the value-weighted CRSP return) on the presence of a post-IPO loan and 
other firm characteristics. The coefficient on Post-IPO Loan is positive and significant 
at the 1 percent level. Consistent with the evidence presented in Table VI, this result 
indicates that borrowing from a bank soon after the IPO is associated with positive 
long-term stock performance. This long-term stock effect is consistent with the pattern 
of long-term operating performance reported in Table V.   
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Table IV 
Changes in Post-IPO Operating Performance 
 
Average changes in return on assets (ROA) are reported for each of five years after the IPO. The 
sample includes U.S. firms that went public during 1990-2000. Post-IPO Borrowers are firms that 
borrow from banks within one year of the firm’s IPO. Non-Borrowers are firms that do not borrow from 
banks within one year of the firm’s IPO. Panel A reports the mean raw change in ROA, measured as 
operating income divided by the book value of total assets from the year of the IPO through each of five 
years post-IPO. Panel B reports the mean industry-adjusted change in ROA, measured as the raw change 
minus the contemporaneous change in industry median ROA for the same time period. The industries 
are based on 4-digit SIC codes if there is a minimum of at least 5 non-issuing firms, else 3-digits SIC 
codes, or 2-digit SIC codes. IPO data are from SDC, bank loan data are from Dealscan, accounting data 
are from COMPUSTAT. t-statistics are in parentheses. *** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Change in ROA Measured through 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
      
Panel A: Raw Change in ROA
All Firms -0.051 -0.069 -0.066 -0.054 -0.055 
   (-12.45)***   (-13.46)***  (-11.02)***  (-8.30)***  (-7.35)*** 
Non-Borrowers  -0.060 -0.078 -0.073 -0.058 -0.058 
 (-11.53)*** (-12.08)***    (-9.55)***  (-6.88)***  (-5.99)*** 
Post-IPO Borrowers -0.024 -0.040 -0.045 -0.044 -0.047 
 (-4.99)*** (-6.76)*** (-7.09)*** (-6.74)*** (-6.68)*** 
Difference in Means -0.035 -0.038 -0.028 -0.014 -0.011 
  (-5.01)*** (-4.33)*** (-2.83)*** (-1.29) (-0.91) 
      
Panel B: Industry-Adjusted Change in ROA
All Firms -0.039 -0.052 -0.050 -0.039 -0.035 
     (-9.20)***   (-10.17)***    (-8.37)***  (-6.01)***  (-4.64)*** 
Non-Borrowers  -0.046 -0.059 -0.055 -0.041 -0.035 
     (-8.66)***     (-9.25)***    (-7.20)***  (-4.88)***  (-3.63)*** 
Post-IPO Borrowers -0.016 -0.029 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 
    (-3.19)***     (-4.52)***    (-5.48)***  (-4.77)***  (-4.12)*** 
Difference in Means -0.030 -0.031 -0.019 -0.005 0.001 
      (-4.04)***     (-3.39)*** (-1.91)* (-0.41) (0.10) 
            
Number of Firms 2,906 2,570 2,251 1,976 1,723 
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Table V 
OLS Regression of Post-IPO Changes in Operating Performance 
 
The sample includes 2,228 U.S. firms that went public during 1990-2000. The dependent variable is 
Change in Industry-Adjusted ROA, measured from the IPO year through 2 years post-IPO. Industry-
Adjusted ROA is defined as net income divided by total assets for the IPO firm minus the industry 
median net income divided by total assets on the same date, where the industries are based on 4-digit 
SIC codes if there is a minimum of at least 5 non-issuing firms, else 3-digit SIC codes, or 2-digit SIC 
codes. Post-IPO Loan equals 1 if an IPO firm borrows from a bank within the first year after going 
public, and it equals 0 otherwise. IPO year dummy variables are included in the regression but not 
reported. IPO data are from SDC, bank loan data are from Dealscan, accounting data are from 
COMPUSTAT, and stock performance data are from CRSP. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. *** 
and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5%levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient Estimate  
Intercept -0.219
    (-5.52)***
 
Post-IPO Loan 0.030
   (2.41)**
 
Tobin’s Q 0.010
    (5.02)***
 
Ln (Net IPO Proceeds) 0.015
   (2.58)**
 
Ln (1+Age)  0.005
 (0.94)
 
Initial Return   0.000
 (0.87)
 
VC-backed  0.008
 (0.73)
 
Adjusted R2 (%) 
 
2.34 
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Table VI 
Buy-and-Hold Returns One, Two and Three Years after the IPO 
 
The sample includes 3,218 U.S. firms that went public during 1990-2000. Post-IPO Borrowers are firms 
that borrow from banks within one year of the firm’s IPO. Non-Borrowers are firms that do not borrow 
from banks within one year of the firm’s IPO. BH Raw Returns are buy-and-hold firm returns, in 
percent. BHVW are buy-and-hold firm returns, in percentages, adjusted for contemporaneous CRSP 
value-weighted returns. BHEW are buy-and-hold firm returns, in percentages, adjusted for 
contemporaneous CRSP equally weighted returns. All returns are measured through 1, 2, and 3 years 
after a firm’s IPO. IPO data are from SDC, bank loan data are from Dealscan, accounting data are from 
COMPUSTAT, and stock performance data are from CRSP. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Performance Measure Post-IPO Borrowers Non-Borrowers Difference  
1-year post-IPO     
BH Raw Returns 117.96 103.82 -14.14*** 
BHVW 2.29 -9.18 -11.47*** 
BHEW 5.35 -9.17 -14.52*** 
  
2-years post-IPO    
BH Raw Returns 133.40 112.39   -21.00*** 
BHVW -0.16 -14.34 -14.18* 
BHEW 5.71 -13.87  -19.58** 
    
3-years post-IPO  
BH Raw Returns 134.49 119.61  -14.88* 
BHVW -14.93 -20.17 -5.23 
BHEW -6.50 -18.11 -11.61 
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Table VII 
OLS Regression of Abnormal Returns Two Years after the IPO  
 
The sample includes 3,218 U.S. firms that went public during 1990-2000. The dependent variable is a 
firm’s buy-and-hold abnormal return, adjusted for contemporaneous CRSP value-weighted return, 
measured through two years following the initial public offering. Post-IPO Loan equals 1 if a firm 
borrows from a bank within the first year after going public, and it equals 0 otherwise. IPO year dummy 
variables are included in the regression but not reported. IPO data are from SDC, bank loan data are 
from Dealscan, accounting data are from COMPUSTAT, and stock performance data are from CRSP. 
Definitions of other variables are provided in Table I. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. *** and ** 
indicate significance at the 1% and 5%levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Coefficient Estimate 
Intercept -0.925
    (-2.86)***
 
Post-IPO Loan 0.343
     (3.37)***
  
Tobin’s Q 0.313
   (18.31)***
  
Ln (Net IPO Proceeds)  0.014
 (0.30)
  
Ln (1+Age)  -0.010
 (-0.25)
  
Initial Return  -0.001
 (-1.42)
  
VC-backed  0.220
    (2.47)**
  
Adjusted R2 (%) 15.91
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V. Conclusion  
Motivated by prior findings that newly public firms are characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty, high information asymmetry between the firm and investors, and 
the few reliable sources of information, we examine whether banks provide valuable 
information about the quality of newly public firms. The main findings can be 
summarized as follows. Bank lending is consistently associated with positive long-term 
outcomes. Post-IPO borrowers, on average, experience significantly smaller decreases in 
operating performance than non-borrowers up to three years after the IPO. Likewise, 
firms that borrow from banks within one year after an IPO experience better long-term 
stock performance, on average up to three years after the IPO.9 This pattern is 
consistent with the ability of banks to reduce the degree of asymmetric information by 
some combination of screening applicants and/or monitoring borrowers’ actions, 
although our data cannot evaluate the relative contribution of these two mechanisms. 
In either case, bank loans appear to be special for newly public firms, consistent with 
recent findings for pre-IPO firms and in contrast to recent findings for seasoned firms.   
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